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Statement of T. Coleman Andrews, president of the 
American Institute of Accountants, 270 Madison Ave., 
New York City, before the Senate Committee on 
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, May 15, 1951.
Mrs. Smith and Gentlemen:
I am here to speak for myself and as president of the American Institute 
of Accountants in response to invitations addressed to me in both capacities by 
your distinguished chairman.
Both the American Institute of Accountants and I appreciate and thank you 
for your invitation, and we have accepted this invitation because the subject of 
S.913 is one concerning which we feel that we are in position to speak with some 
claim to special knowledge, for fiscal problems are the certified public ac­
countants' daily fare.
This is as true of the Federal Government's fiscal problems as it is of 
those of private enterprises, for the accounting profession has contributed 
liberally, in peace as well as in war, not only the rank and file of its membership 
but also its leaders, toward finding solutions for the Government's constant 
succession of fiscal difficulties.
Being aware of your distinguished chairman's interest in simplification 
and economy, we are reluctant to raise our voice in opposition to a bill authored 
by him and intended to help deal more intelligently with the perplexing problem 
of judging and passing upon appropriation requests. However, we do not believe 
that S.913 will either simplify the present situation or effect any economy.
Honorable Committee on Expenditures
in the Executive Departments
-2-
We believe, on the contrary, that it will further complicate what appears 
to us to be an already over-organized, unduly complex, and dangerously obfuscated 
situation, and, in addition, add substantially to the already intolerable cost of 
managing the nations's business.
Worse still, if S.913 should have these undesirable effects, it will add 
to the growing loss of confidence and faith in the government and those who run it 
that now is apparent to every discerning citizen.
We urgently suggest that there is bound to be a point beyond which the 
people will not be willing to go in their tolerance of consistently unsuccessful 
experimentation with the job of gaining and maintaining control of the fiscal 
aspects of their national affairs. Business, both large and small—even business 
that is world-wide in its operations—licked the problem of fiscal control long ago. 
Sooner or later the people will cease to tolerate the government’s failure to deal 
effectively with the aspect of management. We cannot longer afford the “trial-and - 
error” method of dealing with a problem that is no longer a problem anywhere except 
in government.
We heartily agree with the declaration by Senator McClellan at the outset 
of his address to the Senate concerning S.913 on February 19, 1951, that Congression­
al control over the expenditures of the Executive Branch of the Government is much 
needed; and we applaud his further declaration that Congress’s possession of control 
over the Government’s expenditures heightens its duty in times like these “to 
appropriate only as much (as), but no more than, is actually needed.”
We also agree with the Senator’s declaration further along in the same 
address that the budget hearings held by the Appropriations Committee of Congress 
have become practically “ex parte” proceedings. But, considering the fact that the 
Appropriations Committees of Congress have had at their elbows a means, established 
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30 years ago, whereby this deplorable evolution might have been avoided, it is 
somewhat disappointing that for so long a time the full usefulness of this fine 
and proven tool not only has not yet been employed but apparently has not even 
been recognized. More’s the pity when we consider that this tool was created by 
Congress itself, to be its eyes and ears in fiscal matters. But this is getting 
a little ahead of our story.
At first blush, the idea of having a ’’Joint Committee on the Budget” 
sounds like a good one. But on analysis, it becomes clear that, in some of its 
activities at least, a merry-go-round situation would be created. For instance, 
we find, beginning in line 16 on page 4 of S.913 that one of the duties of the 
Joint Committee would be:
”(c) to consider all available information relating 
to estimated revenues, including revenue esti­
mates of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation * * *”
This sounds like hiring auditors to check auditors; the Joint Committee 
on Internal Revenue Taxation checks the Treasury Department—it just recently re­
ported that the Treasury Department’s current revenue estimates were too low—and 
the Joint Committee on the Budget would check the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation. This would be duplication of the most inexcusable sort.
The idea of creating a Joint Committee on the Budget from the Appropriations 
Committees of House and Senate, similar to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation, is appealing at first glance. But actually the parallel is misleading.
Under the Constitution all revenue bills must originate in the House of 
Representatives, and the Senate can in effect originate methods of raising revenue 
only by the expedient of amending House bills. The Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation was created primarily as a means of avoiding the difficulties
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and delays which often resulted from this Constitutional provision.
No such special problem justifies the creation of a Joint Committee on 
the Budget from the Appropriations Committees of the two houses. On the contrary, 
it might well lead to circumventing the checks and balances on appropriations which 
now exist through separate consideration of appropriations bills by the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.
Now to be more specific. On page 3 of his Senate address of February 19, 
1951, Senator McClellan called his colleagues’ attention to the fact that the 
Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate had a combined staff of 55 
persons, whereas Congress had given the Bureau of the Budget a staff of more than 
500.
”What the Senator was getting at here is not clear to us. Surely he could 
not have been suggesting that if the Bureau of the Budget needs a staff of 500 the 
proposed Joint Committee on the Budget would have to have one of that number* The 
only clue he gave to the proposed Joint Committee’s needs is to be found on page 6 
of the same address, where he said that ’’This Joint Committee would be empowered 
to employ an adequate expert staff ***.” An "adequate expert "staff” might easily 
become a full-blown Congressional Bureau of the Budget.
Agreeing, as we said earlier, with your distinguished Chairman’s 
declaration that Congress needs to get control over the expenditures of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, we would not argue for maintaining the status quo; but 
we believe that we should say in passing that we think that a good case could be 
made for the proposition that the better than l-to-10 ratio of the combined staffs 
of the Appropriations Committees of Congress to the staff of the Bureau of the Budget 
is ample. One expert certainly ought to be able to check the finished work of ten 
others. If what we recommend in place of S.913 is adopted, some of the 55 members 
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of the staffs of the Appropriations Committees of Congress may find themselves 
hard put to keep busy with budget matters.
In his address of February 19, Senator McClellan pointed out that the 
Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate have authority under the Legisla­
tive Reorganization Act of 1946 to expand their staffs ”in order to make a more 
systematic and intensive analysis of departmental spending requests” but that 
neither of these committees had fully availed itself of this authority.
He then also pointed out that if these committees should take advantage 
of their authority to expand their staffs they would create a duplication of service 
and expense.
Next he asserted that there are only two approaches to solution (of the 
problem of putting Congress in the saddle with a stout bridle and a bit that would 
really enable it to control expenditures). "One,” he said, ”is by having each of 
the Appropriations Committees adequately expand its staff and confer additional 
authority and powers on the staffs of the two Committees to perform these services. 
The other *** is the approach made in the bill which I have introduced.”
The Senator’s reminder that the maintaining of a staff for the same purpose 
by each of the two Appropriations Committees would be a duplication of both service 
and expense is not open to question. Nor can there be any doubt that a single 
staff for review of the administration’s proposed and actual expenditures is highly 
desirable and would be tremendously helpful; such a staff would provide a check 
on expenditures such as is now provided on revenues by the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.
But the staffs of the two Appropriations Committees already duplicate 
each other to a degree, and the past affords no hope that this duplication would 
be ended by the adoption of S.913. Moreover, there is a better way—a proven one—
Honorable Committee on Expenditures 
in the Executive Departments 
-6- 
one that already is at hand and, therefore, makes the creation of a new organ­
zation unnecessary. Hence, we disagree with the Senator’s statement that the course 
laid out in S.913 is the only alternative to parallel expansion of the staffs
of the two Appropriations Committees.
Our suggestion is a very simple ones USE THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL AND
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. The arguments in favor of this course are so 
obvious and compelling that it seems hardly necessary even to state them; but here 
are a few:
1. The Comptroller General and the staff of the 
General Accounting Office stand second to none 
in knowledge of the organization and management 
of the Government. They’ve been reviewing the 
Government’s affairs most meticulously for the 
past 30 years.
2. They would be moving at full speed before any 
new organization could get up enough steam to 
get started.
3. The Comptroller General is a member of the 
Congressional family. Use him.
4. The services that the staff of the proposed 
Joint Committee on the Budget would render 
are among those that the General Accounting 
Office was created to render to Congress. 
Let the General Accounting Office render these 
services.
5. Use of the Comptroller General and the General 
Accounting Office would give the staffs of the 
Appropriations Committees the help of people 
who are out in the front lines of fiscal oper­
ations every day and who not only know what’s 
going on but also how to interpret what they 
see in terms of economical organization and 
management.
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6. Use of the Comptroller General and the General 
Accounting Office would employ existing person­
nel and facilities and thus would avoid making 
things more complicated and costly than they 
already are.
7. Proper employment of the facilities of the 
General Accounting Office should reduce 
substantially the time devoted to budget 
matters by the staffs of the Appropriations 
Committees.
What more appropriate organization than the General Accounting Office 
could possibly be found to provide the Appropriations Committees and Congress with 
the information they require in order to determine whether the appropriations re­
quested by the administration are necessary and reasonable? The staff of this 
establishment has been reviewing the revenues and expenditures of the Government 
for the past thirty years.
True enough, the review was on a pretty narrow basis until the Government 
Corporation Control Act was passed in 1945. But every transaction was reviewed; 
and since the passage of the Government Corporation Control Act the basis of the 
examinations conducted has been steadily broadened, until today in every examination 
the auditors not only inquire into the legality of expenditures but also weigh them 
from the standpoint of whether they were necessary. They also consider whether the 
activities that they review are economically organized as well as whether they are 
economically managed.
But one doesn't have to argue the logic of using the Comptroller General 
and the General Accounting Office. Congress has already twice said that they shall 
be used. It did so when it passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. It did 
it again when it passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Unfortunately, 
however, Congress has never used the tools that it thus provided and has had at hand.
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Here, for instance, is what section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946 says:
"Section 206. The Comptroller General is authorized and 
directed to make an expenditure analysis of each 
agency in the executive branch of the Government 
(including Government corporations), which, in the 
opinion of the Comptroller General, will enable 
Congress to determine whether public funds have been 
economically and efficiently administered and ex- 
pended * * * * * * * * ." (Underscoring ours)
We suggest that no group is likely to become better qualified to analyze 
plans for future expenditures than those whose business it is to ascertain and 
report to Congress whether public funds previously appropriated have been 
economically and efficiently administered and expended. Those who know the past 
are most likely to be the best judges of the future.
So there you have it. WHAT S.913 WOULD PROVIDE ALREADY IS REQUIRED 
BY EXISTING LAW: Moreover, to a degree it is being provided in audits now being 
made by the General Accounting Office. BUT CONGRESS ISN’T USING IT: Congress is 
fond of calling the Comptroller General its ’’right arm” and its ”watchdog.” The 
moving finger of that right arm oft has become cramped from its prodigious report­
writing, and the watchdog’s throat equally as often has been hoarsened by the 
vigorous warnings it has barked; but Congress seldom has either seen or heard 
these emanations from the hand and throat of its diligent and faithful servant 
in the cloistered and crowded depths of the Old Pension Building, or so it has 
seemed. Often has the Comptroller General been heard to say proudly yet sadly, 
as he did at a Senate sub-committee hearing on his appropriation requests for the 
year ended June 30, 1950:
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”I might say that I have sent more reports to the 
Congress on waste and extravagance in one year than 
my predecessors sent during their entire terms of 
office.”
I should point out, lest someone get the erroneous impression that I am 
saying that the Comptroller General has not done his duty under Section 206 of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, that this directive never has been imple­
mented by an appropriation. The record indicates that $1,000,000 was requested 
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1948, for initiation of the work called for by 
this section, but this request was denied by the Independent Offices Subcommittee 
of the House Appropriations Committee. In reporting on this denial, Congressman 
Wigglesworth, Chairman of the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the House 
Appropriations Committee, had this to says
"The Committee feels that with the assistance already 
being furnished by the General Accounting Office in its 
regular reports and otherwise to Congress and to many 
of its committees, and with the additional help now 
available in the augmented committee staffs, no ad­
ditional appropriation to enable the General Accounting 
Office to begin its new duties under Section 206 of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act can be justified at this 
time.
”The Committee believes that if such expenditures ana­
lyses are to be made on such a scale ^y a permanent 
staff it should be done by the General Accounting Office. 
I have discussed this matter with the Comptroller General 
and he does not object to the elimination of the item of 
$1,000,000, under all the circumstances involved, provided 
it is understood that his office cannot begin work pur­
suant to this new function unless and until an appropria­
tion is made therefor at some later time. I think this, 
of course, will be clearly understood.” 
Congressional Record, Vol. 93, Part 6, Page 7175, 
June 17, 1947 
(Underscoring ours)
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As we understand it, the Senate, in considering the Independent Offices 
Appropriations Act of 1950, added $800,000 to the General Accounting Office’s 
appropriation for initiating the work required under Section 206 of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, but this $800,000 was stricken from the bill in con­
ference and so was not included in the 1950 appropriation as finally approved.
Thus, it is apparent that the General Accounting Office never has been 
given any money to carry out the directive given to the Comptroller General by 
Section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. However, the directive 
remains on the statute books, and we understand that in spite of not having been 
given funds to carry it out the Comptroller General has nevertheless so drawn his 
audit programs that at least some of the expenditure analyses required by this 
section will be made— in fact, are now being made—in the course of his staff’s 
discharge of its regular auditing duties.
Finally, it must be pointed out that if it were decided to use the 
Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office to do what is provided by 
S.913, even this salutary step might duplicate investigative work now being done 
by staffs of committees of Congress and by the legislative staff located in the 
Library of Congress. The same would be true, of course, if S.913 were adopted. 
But Congress can very quickly terminate this duplication by requiring that all 
investigations of fiscal matters be referred to the Comptroller General and the 
General Accounting Office, and we strongly urge that this be done. The Comptroller 
General is Congress’s man; he and the staff of the General Accounting Office work 
for and report to Congress, and their qualifications for making fiscal examinations 
and investigations are of the very highest order.
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To summarize, we heartily concur in the opinion that control of 
appropriations by the Executive Branch of the Government is dangerous and in­
tolerable and that Congress should move without further delay to cure its surrender 
of this vital prerogative. But we strongly urge:
(a) That creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget 
is unnecessary and would worsen rather than im­
prove the present situation;
(b) That full advantage should be taken of the poten­
tialities of the Comptroller General and the 
General Accounting Office as the independent 
auditor and investigator for Congress;
(c) That, specifically, the Comptroller General and 
the General Accounting Office be used to provide 
the Congress with the services called for by 
S.913; and
(d) That the conducting of all investigations of fiscal 
matters be entrusted to the Comptroller General and 
the General Accounting Office.
Last year I testified before this Committee in opposition to a bill that 
became the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. I objected to this bill 
on several grounds—primarily on the grounds that it failed to provide an account­
ing department for the government under a qualified director and that it unduly and 
improperly made the Comptroller General a party to administrative decisions that 
should never be imposed upon any independent auditor. I pointed out that if the 
Comptroller General were to be in fact the independent auditor for Congress and as 
such a member of the Congressional family, he should be used accordingly and should 
be relieved of his part in the management of those affairs that should be regarded 
as—and made—the exclusive responsibility of the Executive Branch of the government.
There were some who chose to assail that testimony as an effort on our 
part to reduce the importance and prestige of the Comptroller General’s office.
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We hope that what we have recommended here today will dispel this groundless fear, 
because these recommendations make specific application of the philosophy upon 
which what we said on that occasion was based. We sought then, and we seek today, 
to prevail upon the Congress to avail itself of all of the potential usefulness 
of an officer and of the staff of an organization who are Congress's own, and who 
could be made not only more useful to Congress than they now are—and their present 
usefulness is undeniably great—but also the most powerful influence for public 
thrift at the national level that the country has ever seen.
We say this with the deepest sincerity and with some emotion, because we 
entertain grave concern about what will happen if the present costly situation is 
not corrected.
So we say: We already have the man, the organization, and the law that 
it takes to do what is called for by S.913. Let’s not make the mistake of piling 
more organization on top of the present bewildering colossus and more expense on 
top of the already inordinate cost of government. What we already have isn’t Just 
good enough; it is exceptionally good. All we have to do is use it. So, let's 
use it
